By Tashbih Sayyed, Ph. D.
In North Waziristan, part of Pakistan's Pushtun belt bordering Afghanistan, crimes are down and people enjoy a relatively peaceful life. Barbers do not shave their customers' beards because it is un-Islamic; thieves are paraded through the streets with their heads shaved and faces painted black; and people suspected of being US "spies" are beheaded routinely and in broad day-light.
Taliban or their sympathizers in North and South Waziristan have killed dozens of people they accused of being Pakistani government supporters or US spies. Recently the body of a cleric who spoke against the rising extremism in the region was found dumped beside a road in the South Waziristan. The body was in a big bag while his head was placed nearby in the open. "He recorded several cassettes in which he criticized us and the Taliban," a Taliban militant said by telephone claiming responsibility for the beheading.
Visitors to the area have no doubt that the Taliban are back and people have welcomed them with open arms. The degree to which the Taliban enjoy the mass support can be gauged from the fact that the people seeking justice, whether it is a family feud, a marital problem or a land dispute with a neighbor, do not go to the government-appointed law courts or law enforcement agencies. They go to the Taliban committees, set up for the purposes of establishing Shariah in the region.
And this phenomenon, observers point out, is not confined to the tribal region only. Contrary to the official claims, Taliban sympathizers and radical Islamists of different shades have always remained powerful everywhere in Pakistan even in Islamabad, the seat of the federal government.
Islamists have found many different ways to challenge government authority. Recently when the Musharraf government razed some illegally constructed mosques to the ground, Islamist women, covered with burqas from head to toe with only their eyes showing through a very narrow slit, invaded the central library in Islamabad, the federal capital, and occupied it. The government agencies could not do anything except to watch helplessly from a distance.
The reasons for fundamentalist power in Pakistan are more than obvious: the first and the foremost being that the Islamic leaders who claim that the US war on terrorism is in reality a Judeo-Christian crusade against Islam have roots in the masses. The most popular religious leaders like Maulana Fazlur Rahman of Madrasa Haqqania that gave birth to the Taliban phenomenon and the Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussein Ahmad, hail from a region which supplies the bulk of armed forces of Pakistan.
Similarly, a majority of the police force in Pakistan come from the rural areas that comprise almost 75% of Pakistan and are in control of the local mosques. Both the soldiers of the armed forces and the police listen to their Imam or prayer leaders who have never abandoned the jihad against the infidels.
That's why the Pakistan's military and the police both have never honestly tried to curb the rising fervor of Islamism in the country or clear out the jihadis from the lawless tribal regions. Aware of this fact, whenever Pakistan authorities sent in the armed forces to the tribal areas, they consisted mostly of the soldiers from non-tribal regions. These non-tribal soldiers had no idea of the difficult terrain and were massacred by the locals as they were trapped like bats in the sunlight.
And Musharraf had no choice but to enter some kind of a deal with the tribal elders. In that agreement, the tribes promised to respect the authority of the Pakistani government and curtail cross-border attacks by extremists. In return, Musharraf returned some of the tribes' weapons, released some prisoners, and withdrew from posts inside North Waziristan.
US officials are concerned about this peace deal. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Eric Edelman, said the agreement to give tribal leaders responsibility for controlling the border area has not worked. At the same hearing, the chief of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, said the safety provided in the Pakistani border areas is a key to the Taliban's recent resurgence and to its plans for the future. "The relative sanctuary for especially Taliban senior leadership in Pakistan today in the border regions of Pakistan is a major factor in the ability of the Taliban to be resurgent and probably quite active militarily this spring in Afghanistan," he said. "There's no question that that sanctuary exists, and that it's a major asset for the Taliban."
The committee chairman, Senator Carl Levin said Pakistan has not even recognized that its agreement with tribal leaders has failed. "We ought to press Pakistan for at least an acknowledgment that the deal that they made has not worked out. In fact, quite the opposite," he said.
Quarters who criticize the Musharraf government's peace deals with the tribal elders aimed at ending the fighting and stopping raids into Afghanistan do so because they do not really understand the realities as they exist on the ground. It is true that the deals have given the jihadis free rein and have led to the resurgence of the Taliban in a region that has become a haven for both al Qaeda and the Taliban. But the fact remains that neither the Taliban nor Al-Qaeda owes their resurgence to any deal or agreement. They are there, period. Deal or no deal.
The US has to understand one thing. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda both are exploiting the age-old tribal traditionalism, religious fundamentalism and love for fighting with the infidel. Today's Al-Qaeda passions fit perfectly with the tribal passion of revenge and the institution of Pushtun vali. No tribal leader will ever find anything wrong with whatever is being preached in the madrassas, which reflect thousands of years of tribal customs. That's why the soldiers of the Pakistan army and members of other law enforcement agencies find it real hard to punish their fellow tribal leaders for something they believe in too.
It is important to note that General Pervez Musharraf signed those deals not because he wanted to but because he had to. He had no choice. This was the only face-saving device he had. Another thing worth appreciating is that the fundamentalist leaders and clerics have roots in the masses and General Pervez Musharraf has no roots; he does not belong anywhere. He has no constituency of his own. He is alone, isolated and finds himself increasingly pushed by all sides.
Against this backdrop, he has to depend almost totally on the armed forces and the intelligence agencies. And neither the armed forces nor the intelligence agencies are with him in this war on terrorism. But he cannot do anything about the situation. Even if he suspects these people of insincerity, he cannot possibly challenge them or criticize their ways of working without jeopardizing his own security.
The armed forces and the intelligence agencies, contrary to what anyone says, are infested with minds who are either themselves fundamentalists or are in sympathy with the fundamentalists or are anti-American because of their nationalistic leanings. They do not want the US to succeed in Afghanistan. They believe that the US success against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban will be a disaster for Pakistan. I am told in my conversations with Pakistanis of some importance that many Pakistani policy makers are more than convinced that the US as soon as it succeeds in Afghanistan will go full throttle with India leaving Pakistan in a lurch.
Many of the Pakistani generals and intelligence chiefs are certain that because of the US fixation on containing China, Pakistan does not fit into its game plan: Washington has to empower India and it will be done at the cost of Pakistan's national security. My sources have tell me that whatever happens, Pakistan can never abandon its support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; this is the only lever it has to safeguard against any future US and Indian adventures in the region.
In light of these facts the US, in addition to its dependence on Pakistan, has to think about other ways to counter the Taliban and Al-Qaeda challenge in South and West Asia.
(Tashbih Sayyed is the Editor in Chief of the weekly newspapers 'Muslim World Today', and 'Pakistan Today', President of Council for Democracy and Tolerance, (a non-profit organization) an adjunct fellow of Hudson Institute, and a regular columnist for newspapers across the world.)
